Throughout my readin of Tertullian, I gritted my teeth in frustration. He unjustly attacked Socrates, God of philosophy, in an abrasive and fallacious manner.
In part I, Tertullian argues that we must turn to God, rather than to philosophers, for information about the soul. He proceeds to use an ad hominen circumstantial fallacy to discredit Socrates' arguments in the Phaedo. What an ad hominen circumstantial does, essentially, is argue that since the opponent has a certain inclination to argue in a certain way, his argument is invalid, all the while ignoring all the points of the opponents actual argument. Tertullian states that, "Socrates' constancy itself must have been shaken, as he struggled against the disturbance of the excitement around him," continuing on to write, "It is therefore not to be wondered at . . . in the face of death itself, [he] asserts the immortality of the soul by a strong assumption such as was wanted to frustrate the wrong (they had inflicted upon him). So that all the wisdom of Socrates, at that moment, proceeded from the affectation of an assumed composure rather than the firm conviction of ascertained truth." Wow. . . So basically, since Socrates was going to die, and because he was pissed off at people for sentencing him to his death, he was naturally inclined to argue that the soul is eternal. In fact, his whole argument is basically just a response to his desire to get back at people. . . This made me so mad. Socrates is the man.
The irony lies in the fact that this same tactic could so easily be reversed on Tertullian. People like to believe that life will continue after death, and that there is a nice place called heaven where Jesus, who saved us all from eternal damnation, is waiting with an open bar for all. Since Christian theology paints a pretty nice picture, i.e., since people like to believe in Christianity, then by Tertullian's own reasoning, Christianity is a hoax.
Furthermore, Tertullian's insistence that faith is the only path to truth is a questionable assertion at best. He argues this by claiming that all truth belongs to his religion, and therefore, is the product of this religion. God is the product of all truth, and therefore all those who have said something true were influenced by God. This is seriously messed up. This is like saying that the Native Americans lived in the United States. Tertullian is retroactively giving his religion credit for the achievements of thousands of years of "pagan" progress. Furthermore, how can faith possibly be more reliable than reason? To make any sort of determination, Tertullian must use reason. One cannot arrive at a conclusion, not even a conclusion that reason is inferior or insufficient or useless, without using reason.
Tertullian was writing rhetoric. He was fanatically and irrationally marketing a religion that deserved better.
Showing posts with label Alex Schaefer. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alex Schaefer. Show all posts
Sunday, May 1, 2011
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
"We are simply the universe experiencing itself"
I discovered this quote several weeks ago on my tumblr account, and because of how I found it, I cannot validate completely who it’s by, but it was attributed to Mercurius. Nevertheless, it is very relevant to Neo-Platonism and the relationship of the subject and the object. It reminded me of the thought exercise that we did in which I imagined everything that exists being contained within a sphere, and then asked “where am I?” I was both the subject, surveying all of existence, and myself part of existence. Just now the question might could be asked "am I the universe or am I experiencing it?" Both. It is us we are it. This quotation points out that even though we experience the universe, we are certainly part of it. All is one, ourselves included.
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
Class Synopsis—Friday, March 18
After taking our quiz, we reviewed the 10 modes of skepticism:
1. based on the variety in animals;
2. on the differences in human beings;
3. on the different structures of the organs of sense;
4. on the circumstantial conditions;
5. on positions and intervals and locations;
6. on intermixtures;
7. on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects;
8. on the fact of relativity;
9. on the frequency or rarity of occurrence;
10. on the disciplines and customs and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions.
Or, in Dr. Layne’s “catchy” acronym: A SIC A QuPREC (Dr. Layne narrates "It kinda ryhmes and reminds me of something a character in Alice in Wonderland might say. Imagine Humpty Dumpty getting annoyed and instead of telling her 'Ah I am sick of pricks.' He says A SIC A QuPREC which ultimately just means I have ten ways of refuting pricks")
A nimals, humans
S ense Organs
I nterval, place, position
C ircumstance
A dmixture
Qu antities
P roportions
R elativity
E vents (Rare or Frequent)
C ustoms, dogmas, laws
These modes each constitute a reason why our perception/judgments are distorted and unreliable.
We then discussed Pyrro of Elis, and how he was influenced by Democritus, whose atomistic views suggested that since the senses are unreliable, reality was unknowable. Much of what we know of Pyrro comes from Timon, who suggests 3 questions:
1) What are objects like by nature?
2) What attitude should we then have?
3) What results from this attitude?
With corresponding answers:
1) Things are indifferent and cannot be judged.
2) So our perceptions/beliefs are not t/f—no trust in them—and they must remain without belief.
3) Speechlessness and ataraxia.
Pyrro: “No more this than that”
“Both is and is not”
Academic Skepticism was led by Arcesilaus (315-240), who became the head of the academy. He attempted to relate skepticism back to Plato and Socrates to avoid being overly controversial, but he basically taught Pyrronian skepticism. He advocated not advocating anything; he asserted that one should not make assertions; he preferred to not have preferences; he didn’t "know that he does not know." He also rejected that Truth was attainable and believed it was irrelevant to morality.
The third academy was led by Carneads (214-129), who believed that he could not know anything, yet accepted probability as good substitute for absolute knowledge. He was fervently anti-stoic, being a radical skeptic, and he formulated a criteria for living.
1. based on the variety in animals;
2. on the differences in human beings;
3. on the different structures of the organs of sense;
4. on the circumstantial conditions;
5. on positions and intervals and locations;
6. on intermixtures;
7. on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects;
8. on the fact of relativity;
9. on the frequency or rarity of occurrence;
10. on the disciplines and customs and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions.
Or, in Dr. Layne’s “catchy” acronym: A SIC A QuPREC (Dr. Layne narrates "It kinda ryhmes and reminds me of something a character in Alice in Wonderland might say. Imagine Humpty Dumpty getting annoyed and instead of telling her 'Ah I am sick of pricks.' He says A SIC A QuPREC which ultimately just means I have ten ways of refuting pricks")
A nimals, humans
S ense Organs
I nterval, place, position
C ircumstance
A dmixture
Qu antities
P roportions
R elativity
E vents (Rare or Frequent)
C ustoms, dogmas, laws
These modes each constitute a reason why our perception/judgments are distorted and unreliable.
We then discussed Pyrro of Elis, and how he was influenced by Democritus, whose atomistic views suggested that since the senses are unreliable, reality was unknowable. Much of what we know of Pyrro comes from Timon, who suggests 3 questions:
1) What are objects like by nature?
2) What attitude should we then have?
3) What results from this attitude?
With corresponding answers:
1) Things are indifferent and cannot be judged.
2) So our perceptions/beliefs are not t/f—no trust in them—and they must remain without belief.
3) Speechlessness and ataraxia.
Pyrro: “No more this than that”
“Both is and is not”
Academic Skepticism was led by Arcesilaus (315-240), who became the head of the academy. He attempted to relate skepticism back to Plato and Socrates to avoid being overly controversial, but he basically taught Pyrronian skepticism. He advocated not advocating anything; he asserted that one should not make assertions; he preferred to not have preferences; he didn’t "know that he does not know." He also rejected that Truth was attainable and believed it was irrelevant to morality.
The third academy was led by Carneads (214-129), who believed that he could not know anything, yet accepted probability as good substitute for absolute knowledge. He was fervently anti-stoic, being a radical skeptic, and he formulated a criteria for living.
Monday, March 21, 2011
My Journey Through the Skeptic Jungle
My introduction to philosophy was a verbatim summary of Descartes' meditations, minus the part about God making everything okay. My friend Allen and I stayed up all night dicussing philosophy, as we would often do in coming years. I was almost entirely ignorant. He mopped the floor with me as he explained why I couldn't trust even my firmest knowledge. I endeavored to prove him wrong.
Four years later, never having proved Allen (Descartes) wrong, I was a philosophy major at Loyola. When I started my philosophy course, called "Skepticism, Knowledge, and Certitude," I was the #1 defender of Descartes and his skeptical ideas. We studied G. E. Moore, who attempted to move past skepticism, and epistemological idealism, by saying "Here is a hand (raising one of his hands). Here is another hand (raising the other). There are at least two objects external objects in the world. Therefore, an external world exists." Needless to say, I was unconvinced. Then we began to read On Certainty by Ludwig Wittgenstein.
One of the first things pointed out be Wittgenstein was that a Cartesian subject--a solipsistic entity that has imagined all human contact and other perceptions--could not possibly even articulate his ideas or philosophy, for he must doubt even his words. Furthermore, a private language is impossible, since words must be learned through observing their use in a community. A Cartesian subject would have no use for language, and therefore would never have conceived of it.
The most important point that Wittgenstein makes is that there is a certain frame of reference or foundation that all human beings must accept in order to engage in debate, or research, or in survival. These unquestionable items constitute the very locus from where all knowledge is analyzed. These certainties are displayed in action, not in language, and constitute a separate category, for they cannot properly be called knowledge. A belief or hypothesis becomes knowledge once it is tested, but can we test the very means or foundation of testing? Of course not; to test something like our own existence is ludicrous. We don’t know that there is an external world, but it is a certitude that is demonstrated when we do anything. Thus, Wittgenstein draws a distinction between knowledge, and certainty. Certainty is born out in action; it is accepted regardless of examination.
What the skeptics do, essentially, is bring these certainties into the realm of propositions, creating what Wittgenstein calls "hinge propositions," because all knowledge hinges on such propositions. These propositions, such as "Here is a hand (raising my hand).", rest on nothing, and cannot be supported by anything more basic than them--they constitute the base of all thinking. I shouldn’t even have to say I have a hand—it is just accepted. It is the world-view we have all inherited. Wittgenstein's certainties constitute a new foundationalism.
So finally I had reached the end of the road. Descartes’ entire project (as well as the Hellenistic skeptics’) is merely a category mistake, a failure to identify “Wittgensteinian certitude” the true foundation of what we call “knowledge”. I wrote Allen a letter—the jack-ass.
Four years later, never having proved Allen (Descartes) wrong, I was a philosophy major at Loyola. When I started my philosophy course, called "Skepticism, Knowledge, and Certitude," I was the #1 defender of Descartes and his skeptical ideas. We studied G. E. Moore, who attempted to move past skepticism, and epistemological idealism, by saying "Here is a hand (raising one of his hands). Here is another hand (raising the other). There are at least two objects external objects in the world. Therefore, an external world exists." Needless to say, I was unconvinced. Then we began to read On Certainty by Ludwig Wittgenstein.
One of the first things pointed out be Wittgenstein was that a Cartesian subject--a solipsistic entity that has imagined all human contact and other perceptions--could not possibly even articulate his ideas or philosophy, for he must doubt even his words. Furthermore, a private language is impossible, since words must be learned through observing their use in a community. A Cartesian subject would have no use for language, and therefore would never have conceived of it.
The most important point that Wittgenstein makes is that there is a certain frame of reference or foundation that all human beings must accept in order to engage in debate, or research, or in survival. These unquestionable items constitute the very locus from where all knowledge is analyzed. These certainties are displayed in action, not in language, and constitute a separate category, for they cannot properly be called knowledge. A belief or hypothesis becomes knowledge once it is tested, but can we test the very means or foundation of testing? Of course not; to test something like our own existence is ludicrous. We don’t know that there is an external world, but it is a certitude that is demonstrated when we do anything. Thus, Wittgenstein draws a distinction between knowledge, and certainty. Certainty is born out in action; it is accepted regardless of examination.
What the skeptics do, essentially, is bring these certainties into the realm of propositions, creating what Wittgenstein calls "hinge propositions," because all knowledge hinges on such propositions. These propositions, such as "Here is a hand (raising my hand).", rest on nothing, and cannot be supported by anything more basic than them--they constitute the base of all thinking. I shouldn’t even have to say I have a hand—it is just accepted. It is the world-view we have all inherited. Wittgenstein's certainties constitute a new foundationalism.
So finally I had reached the end of the road. Descartes’ entire project (as well as the Hellenistic skeptics’) is merely a category mistake, a failure to identify “Wittgensteinian certitude” the true foundation of what we call “knowledge”. I wrote Allen a letter—the jack-ass.
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
World-View Mayhem
One of the things that I find the most frustrating about reading ancient philosophy is the huge number of unsubstantiated claims that get thrown around. For example, the Stoics' belief in the gods. Where did they see them? What experience do they have with them? What they provide us with is a line of reasoning that seems, for some reason, strange, antiquated, irrelevant. I realized, however, that this is because I am being presented a world-view drastically different than any one which I could encounter today. Our most basic premises are not shared, and for this reason, it is very difficult to wrap my finger around the totality of what they're saying. Every sentence I read from the book floods my mind with a million objections that I need to suppress in order to focus and try to latch on to a world-view such as the Stoics', that says free-will is freedom of the attitude, or that nothing is something. These claims make no sense to me, and my head is screaming "no, no, no", but whenever I am able to forcibly silence my own thoughts, I can sometimes catch a glimpse of the thoughts of the Hellenistic philosophers.
This has led me to conclude that there are multiple (perhaps equally valid) ways to view the world, and existence. The issue is that many of them are mutually exclusive.
This has led me to conclude that there are multiple (perhaps equally valid) ways to view the world, and existence. The issue is that many of them are mutually exclusive.
The Hellenistic Philosophers--Class Synopsis February 25, 2011
We began by discussing Zeno as a reactionary. He saw that Epicureanism was sweeping Greece and sought to reverse this trend, because he saw Epicureanism as a false philosophy. Zeno harbored a special hatred for atomism, and hedonism (pleasure as the good), two Epicurean staples.
We then learned that the word for Epicurus’ school, “Stoa”, means “porch” in Greek. This name was used because, being a foreigner, Zeno was not permitted to own his own space, and thus he and his followers met on a porch.
There were three main periods of Stoic thought: ancient, middle, and Roman/new Stoa.
On a side note, Dr. Layne mentioned that not-being has an ontological status of being to the Stoics, which is a crucial point, for it will have many implications in metaphysics.
Again expressing the dialogue between Epicureanism and Stoicism, Dr. Layne showed us a chart which depicted the almost diametrical nature of their belief systems. Glancing over: where the Stoics believed in monism, the Epicureans believed in atomism; where the Stoics defended an absolute teleology, the Epicureans disregarded any notion of an ultimate end or goal; where the Stoics were Pantheistic (their Gods played an integral role in the composition and nature of our world), the Epicureans believed in absentee gods; to the Stoics the soul was distinct from the body, but to the Epicureans, the soul was embodied (made of tiny, round atoms); where the Stoics held a strict, deontological ethic, the Epicureans believed that pleasure was the good.
The metaphor of the orchard illustrated the tripartition of philosophy from the Stoics’ perspective. The walls or outer parameter of an orchard is logic: it delimits and defends the orchard. The necessary conditions of the orchard, like sunshine, and water, and everything necessary for the trees to grow, represents physics. And finally, the fruit of all our labor is Ethics.
Logos meant many things to the Stoics. It was the source of truth in logic, the constructive principle in physics, and the normative principle in ethics. Long describes logos as having two parts: 1) dialectic, and 2) rhetoric. By all accounts, logos acts as a fountainhead of understanding. Rejecting the Parmenidian and Platonic sense of nous, the Stoics subscribed to a Heraclitean logos in order to argue for the objective and subjective man. This point became very unclear to me as it was then connected to episteme (mind), and ousia (being). It seemed to boil down to logos being “in us”.
The Stoics placed a heavy emphasis on language, and saw logos as the principle of truth, i.e., the law of thinking, knowing, and speaking (again, dialectic and rhetoric). Since logic is the elaboration of the criteria for truth, it needed to be treated first, so that it could act as the hand-servant of the Stoics’ other investigations (especially ethics).
The Stoic reliance on the senses, or their epistemological optimism, led them to engage in a dispute with the skeptics. For the Stoics, man is born “Tabula Rasa” or “blank slate”. We have no intuitive knowledge. Experience is the source of everything we know, meaning that sensation holds an important position to the stoics, for all knowledge depends upon it.
Foreshadowing Descartes’ “clear and distinct” ideas, the Stoics argued that only cataleptic sensations were infallible. These referred to any comprehensive presentation of reality. The term verdical presentation was brought up, meaning a sensation to which we assent—logos in our soul. This is important to the stoics, because they believed that we were not free as to whether or not we experience a certain sensation, but we were free to affirm/assent to or deny said sensation.
This “liberty of assent” should adhere to certain rules put forward by the stoics. These rules took the form of Stoic logic, or dialectic, which provides guidelines for inference.
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Just Chill, Epicurus is Cool
So, when we discussed Epicureanism for the first day, I noticed a strongly negative reaction to Epicurus’ egoism. When the term moral selfishness gets thrown around, people picture a barbarian with a turkey leg in one hand, a club in the other, and sex in his eyes. Frankly, I think that this reaction is unwarranted and based on an incomplete understanding of what Epicurus meant. A division should be drawn between pleasure and deeper set ends/goals/values. To elucidate, someone may gain immense pleasure from an altruistic action. Take Mother Theresa for example. She obviously liked taking care of poor starving children. She found purpose, and thus pleasure in those actions. Her sense of purpose came from achieving her objectives, this was also the source of her pleasure, but the objectives themselves were far from selfish.
As is common with Epicurus, he focuses in on the most sensible aspect and equates it with totality. Epicurus noticed the pleasure that can come from offering, as well as receiving, compassion and love. Consequently, he spent little time contemplating the ultimate goal or value that was achieved, producing that pleasure, and instead focused in on the pleasure itself. Epicurus was saying the same thing as Mother Theresa, just with an extremely different emphasis. So step off.
As is common with Epicurus, he focuses in on the most sensible aspect and equates it with totality. Epicurus noticed the pleasure that can come from offering, as well as receiving, compassion and love. Consequently, he spent little time contemplating the ultimate goal or value that was achieved, producing that pleasure, and instead focused in on the pleasure itself. Epicurus was saying the same thing as Mother Theresa, just with an extremely different emphasis. So step off.
Monday, February 21, 2011
Nietzsche: Modern Epicurian(ish)
"How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more venomous than the joke that Epicurus made at the expense of Plato and the Platonists: he called them 'Dionysiokolakes'. Literally and primarily, this means 'flatterers of Dionysus', that is, the tyrant's appendages and toadies; but it also suggests: 'They are all actors, there is nothing genuine about them' (for the term 'Dionysioklax' was a popular term for actor). And that last part is the really malicious remark which Epicurus hurled against Plato: the theatricality which Plato, along with his pupils, deployed so well, the way they set themselves in the scene, things Epicurus did not understand. Epicurus, the old schoolmaster from Samos, sat tucked away in his little garden in Athens and wrote three hundred books—out of fury and ambition against Plato—who knows?
It took a hundred years until Greece came to realize who this garden god Epicurus was.
Did they realize?"
I chose Nietzsche as my modern Epicurian for several reasons that I will hopefully get to explicate more fully on Wednesday. But here is the basic run-down:
Materialism: Nietzsche denies the existence of morality. He sees it as culturally relative, arbitrary, and fabricated. What he does see as real is the physical world. In place of morality, Nietzsche offers psychology "the queen of the sciences", and believes that the "will to power" is what individuals should use to guide their actions. Nietzsche believes that existence, action, reality take precedence over the absurd language games that many other philosophers liked to play.
Ethics: Nietzsche's ethics are, in a way, a reinterpretation of hedonism. Although very different from Epicurus' version, it is nevertheless concerned with conquering and gaining pleasure through power. All in all, it's highly egoistic.
Hatred of Stoicism:"So you want to live 'according to nature?' Oh, you noble Stoics, what a fraud is in this phrase! Imagine something like nature, profligate without measure, indifferent without measure, without purpose and regard, without mercy and justice, fertile and barren and uncertain at the same time, think of indifference itself as power — how could you live according to this indifference? Living — isn't that wanting specifically to be something other than this nature? Isn't living assessing, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different? And assuming your imperative to 'live according to nature' basically amounts to 'living according to life' — well how could you not? Why make a principle out of what you yourselves are and must be?"
It took a hundred years until Greece came to realize who this garden god Epicurus was.
Did they realize?"
I chose Nietzsche as my modern Epicurian for several reasons that I will hopefully get to explicate more fully on Wednesday. But here is the basic run-down:
Materialism: Nietzsche denies the existence of morality. He sees it as culturally relative, arbitrary, and fabricated. What he does see as real is the physical world. In place of morality, Nietzsche offers psychology "the queen of the sciences", and believes that the "will to power" is what individuals should use to guide their actions. Nietzsche believes that existence, action, reality take precedence over the absurd language games that many other philosophers liked to play.
Ethics: Nietzsche's ethics are, in a way, a reinterpretation of hedonism. Although very different from Epicurus' version, it is nevertheless concerned with conquering and gaining pleasure through power. All in all, it's highly egoistic.
Hatred of Stoicism:"So you want to live 'according to nature?' Oh, you noble Stoics, what a fraud is in this phrase! Imagine something like nature, profligate without measure, indifferent without measure, without purpose and regard, without mercy and justice, fertile and barren and uncertain at the same time, think of indifference itself as power — how could you live according to this indifference? Living — isn't that wanting specifically to be something other than this nature? Isn't living assessing, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different? And assuming your imperative to 'live according to nature' basically amounts to 'living according to life' — well how could you not? Why make a principle out of what you yourselves are and must be?"
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
Diogenes: Shameless or Barbaric?
Today I picked out a major contention that I have with Diogenes (yes! Possible paper topic). According to Dr. Layne, he claimed to be living the rational life, meaning that even his shameless actions were for the good or the purpose of enlightening through exemplification. Diogenes believed that the convention of shame was a societal superstition, and chose to live “naturally”. But upon closer examination, the life of Diogenes was neither rational, not natural.
But Aristotle would argue that man’s rational faculty, or nous, is characterized by its ability to draw out universals from particulars. Therefore, that which is rational is universal. The problem that arises from Diogenes’ lifestyle is it elitist nature. I know it may sound silly to call a homeless beggar an elitist, but hear me out. Diogenes survived merely by the productive energies of others. He begged constantly to barely sustain himself, and slept in buildings he took no part in constructing. Besides the irrational contradiction of Diogenes’ commitment to independence and simultaneous parasitism, he also created an ethical system that is far from universal, and therefore, irrational in Aristotle’s sense of the word. Imagine for a moment an entire society of cynics, each begging from each other, laying around with no codes of conduct, scoffing at any attempt to create order, tradition, or law. It wouldn’t function. They would die. That is why I call it elitist—only a select few could possibly have the privilege of engaging in the pure cynic way of life.
One could at least say, if not rationally, that Diogenes existed naturally, right? It’s a trick question, because it contains an imbedded contradiction. No, the life of Diogenes was not natural, because humans are rational creatures. Humans, naturally, use their rational abilities to produce things for themselves. That is how we survive: production. Diogenes, on the other hand, stifled that drive and instead chose to exist as a sub-human parasite, living outside, naked like an animal. Diogenes’ inhumanity is illustrated in his glee at the prospect of not using bowls or utensils. His reasoning is absurdly off base. It is natural for homo-sapiens to create tools that make their lives more comfortable and efficient. That’s what natural is for us. We adapt our background to fit our needs. Diogenes, like an animal, does the opposite. It is self-tyranny, and it is no wonder that he accepted the name Dog.
But Aristotle would argue that man’s rational faculty, or nous, is characterized by its ability to draw out universals from particulars. Therefore, that which is rational is universal. The problem that arises from Diogenes’ lifestyle is it elitist nature. I know it may sound silly to call a homeless beggar an elitist, but hear me out. Diogenes survived merely by the productive energies of others. He begged constantly to barely sustain himself, and slept in buildings he took no part in constructing. Besides the irrational contradiction of Diogenes’ commitment to independence and simultaneous parasitism, he also created an ethical system that is far from universal, and therefore, irrational in Aristotle’s sense of the word. Imagine for a moment an entire society of cynics, each begging from each other, laying around with no codes of conduct, scoffing at any attempt to create order, tradition, or law. It wouldn’t function. They would die. That is why I call it elitist—only a select few could possibly have the privilege of engaging in the pure cynic way of life.
One could at least say, if not rationally, that Diogenes existed naturally, right? It’s a trick question, because it contains an imbedded contradiction. No, the life of Diogenes was not natural, because humans are rational creatures. Humans, naturally, use their rational abilities to produce things for themselves. That is how we survive: production. Diogenes, on the other hand, stifled that drive and instead chose to exist as a sub-human parasite, living outside, naked like an animal. Diogenes’ inhumanity is illustrated in his glee at the prospect of not using bowls or utensils. His reasoning is absurdly off base. It is natural for homo-sapiens to create tools that make their lives more comfortable and efficient. That’s what natural is for us. We adapt our background to fit our needs. Diogenes, like an animal, does the opposite. It is self-tyranny, and it is no wonder that he accepted the name Dog.
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Rand discussing the influence of Aristotelian/Platonic philosophy on writing
For a nonfiction writing course I was asked to read a chapter from Ayn Rand’s The Art of Nonfiction. The chapter was entitled Creating an Outline, and I was shocked by the amount of overlap between this chapter and our discussions last week on Plato and Aristotle. Rand is highly critical of Plato in many respects. One section of the chapter was called The Platonic Approach to Logical Order, and in it Rand makes the claim that to a Platonist “there is a dangerous misconception that there is … only one possible logical order of presentation.” Rejecting this view, Rand, who referred to her philosophy as Aristotelian, asserts that “the principles behind determining the order of an outline are abstractions subsuming a vast number of concretes. You can establish rules about these principles, but not about the use of concretes. No set of principles can give you one logical order.” What I found particularly interesting about Rand’s perspective was her belief that one’s philosophical perspective is capable of determining how one will perform even the minutest of tasks, such as writing an outline. I backtracked to the chapter that came before, which we were not required to read, and I stumbled upon this explanatory passage: “I have often said that the whole history of philosophy is a duel between Plato and Aristotle, and that this conflict is present in every issue” [italics mine]. Rand saw one’s view of the relationship between abstract principles and concrete particulars as highly definitive. For an Aristotelian these things do not exist apart from each other, and for a Platonist, archetypes or universals do exist apart from their concrete manifestations.
It became even more relevant when Rand then delved into Aristotles four causes, specifically his conception of the final and efficient cause:
"By final causation, Aristotle meant that a purpose is set in advance, and then the steps required to achieve it are determined…To do anything, you must know what you want to achieve. For instance, if you decide to drive to Chicago, the roads you select, the amount of gas, etc., will be determined by that goal. But to get there, you will have to start a process of efficient causation, which includes filling the gas tank, starting the car, steering, etc. But the whole process will be a chain of actions you have selected in order to achieve a certain process, namely, to get to Chicago."
Regardless of whether Rand’s analysis of these ideas is bias towards Aristotle or under-researched, she puts into perspective just how important even one’s most abstract convictions are. They affect how one thinks. Therefore they will affect how one writes, talks, votes, and any other action. Philosophy affects one’s entire world-view (whether consciously accepted or not). Likewise, a certain philosophy, if accepted by a society, would greatly change the way it views, and thus interacts with its world. Philosophy has (and has exercised) the power to shape the world.
It became even more relevant when Rand then delved into Aristotles four causes, specifically his conception of the final and efficient cause:
"By final causation, Aristotle meant that a purpose is set in advance, and then the steps required to achieve it are determined…To do anything, you must know what you want to achieve. For instance, if you decide to drive to Chicago, the roads you select, the amount of gas, etc., will be determined by that goal. But to get there, you will have to start a process of efficient causation, which includes filling the gas tank, starting the car, steering, etc. But the whole process will be a chain of actions you have selected in order to achieve a certain process, namely, to get to Chicago."
Regardless of whether Rand’s analysis of these ideas is bias towards Aristotle or under-researched, she puts into perspective just how important even one’s most abstract convictions are. They affect how one thinks. Therefore they will affect how one writes, talks, votes, and any other action. Philosophy affects one’s entire world-view (whether consciously accepted or not). Likewise, a certain philosophy, if accepted by a society, would greatly change the way it views, and thus interacts with its world. Philosophy has (and has exercised) the power to shape the world.
Saturday, January 29, 2011
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Independent Standards
"And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state."
I find this segment very interesting. Socrates is advancing upon a point which I have considered crucial in any proper system of ethics. This precept is independence. Although Plato does not fully develop this idea, the direction he is heading is clear. I will flesh out his metaphor to better understand what he appears to be aiming at. If one’s life is a ship, then one’s consciousness would be the pilot—that which decides upon the general course it will take. Now in his question, Socrates asks “would you only aim at being the best pilot on board?” Perhaps no one on board is competent to pilot the ship. Then what does it mean to be the best of them? If all one aims at is to beat others, then one’s mind is subordinated to the minds of others. One is blindly accepting another’s standard of value—one would be a second-hander. At the beginning of the dialogue, Alcibiades is not concerned with being the best he can be. He is not concerned with knowledge or ideas. He is only concerned with other people—how can he control them? How can he be better than them? How can he appear successful to them? I believe that what Plato was encircling, without ever stating explicitly, is that Alcibiades should have been concerned with achieving, and nothing else. Not to beat others, but to live up to his own potential.
Now what Plato does write is that instead of trying to out do those who are on your own team, one should find the greatest individuals who are in opposition to one’s self. Instead of being the best captain on one’s ship, one should be the best captain on the sea. This is perhaps one step away from expelling altogether the notion that’s one’s sense of value, one’s self-esteem can come from how others view you or how one views himself in relation to others. There appears to be an element of the good life which must be self-generated, for one cannot call it “self”-esteem if it does not come from within, but rather from others. The bottom line is that each man must make his own decisions, steer his own ship, and his decisions will be made based on the knowledge which he possesses. Each man must rely on his own thinking, since it is impossible for another to acquire knowledge for him. This is independence: self-sufficience of the mind. Socrates attempts to show Alcibiades that true knowledge must be actively acquired—discovered on one’s own, or learned from another. Socrates attempts to show Alcibiades independence.
I find this segment very interesting. Socrates is advancing upon a point which I have considered crucial in any proper system of ethics. This precept is independence. Although Plato does not fully develop this idea, the direction he is heading is clear. I will flesh out his metaphor to better understand what he appears to be aiming at. If one’s life is a ship, then one’s consciousness would be the pilot—that which decides upon the general course it will take. Now in his question, Socrates asks “would you only aim at being the best pilot on board?” Perhaps no one on board is competent to pilot the ship. Then what does it mean to be the best of them? If all one aims at is to beat others, then one’s mind is subordinated to the minds of others. One is blindly accepting another’s standard of value—one would be a second-hander. At the beginning of the dialogue, Alcibiades is not concerned with being the best he can be. He is not concerned with knowledge or ideas. He is only concerned with other people—how can he control them? How can he be better than them? How can he appear successful to them? I believe that what Plato was encircling, without ever stating explicitly, is that Alcibiades should have been concerned with achieving, and nothing else. Not to beat others, but to live up to his own potential.
Now what Plato does write is that instead of trying to out do those who are on your own team, one should find the greatest individuals who are in opposition to one’s self. Instead of being the best captain on one’s ship, one should be the best captain on the sea. This is perhaps one step away from expelling altogether the notion that’s one’s sense of value, one’s self-esteem can come from how others view you or how one views himself in relation to others. There appears to be an element of the good life which must be self-generated, for one cannot call it “self”-esteem if it does not come from within, but rather from others. The bottom line is that each man must make his own decisions, steer his own ship, and his decisions will be made based on the knowledge which he possesses. Each man must rely on his own thinking, since it is impossible for another to acquire knowledge for him. This is independence: self-sufficience of the mind. Socrates attempts to show Alcibiades that true knowledge must be actively acquired—discovered on one’s own, or learned from another. Socrates attempts to show Alcibiades independence.
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