Showing posts with label Backes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Backes. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

Agora and Modern Atheism

http://www.wordonfire.org/WOF-TV/Commentaries-New/Fr--Barron-comments-on--Agora-.aspx

When we mentioned Agora again in class it reminded me of a priest, Fr. Barron, who acts as sort of an apologists to Catholicism. He talks about Agora, but more specifically he focuses on the blatant anti-Catholicism of the movie director. It sort of mirrors what was going on in the age of the early Church fathers. For the third time in history (Post-Reformation through Enlightenment being the other) blatant anti-Catholicism is acceptable, leading some like Fr. Barron to call it the last acceptable prejudice. But it is interesting that this period has more in common with the first: many different sides are coming down on the Church (mostly from the atheists now-a-days though) and religious sentiment of both periods are more like each other than the other.

Agora is such a great movie to match this modern sentiment of hatred towards Catholicism and even Christianity in generally. This period is taken by the director and twisted to match his own version of Christianity: people that are ignorant and destructive. While the Christians at that time certainly were not the best (indeed at no point in history has it ever been clean), the director makes it seems as if they are beasts.

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

We talked about the interpretation of text and there was a spark of interest in the nature of a text: whether it is objective or subjective. A thought a good modern example of this is Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451. Bradbury was overwhelmingly disappointed in the poor understanding of Fahrenheit 451. People thought it was about government censorship, because they claimed that temperature was the same temperature at which paper burned, and in turn the temperature at which book burnings can be committed (the temperature is actually 450 Celsius).
The book actually turns out to be about the numbing effects of technology. Bradbury, although a science fiction writer, was himself a Luddite. The government is not the problem, the people are. The irony of this is that the people of this society cannot recognize his message, perhaps because society has numbed them from working through the intricacies of a text.

Class Synopisis April 11th

We began class by talking about distinguishing between the contemporary way to read a text and the classical way. Neo-Platonists read him pedagogically, so as to progress from one part of philosophy to the next. Contemporary scholarship focuses on how Plato's philosophy develops as Plato himself develops. The classical way of reading Plato composed them into tetrarchies, containing three dramas and one seder play. Iamblicus was the one responsible for ordering the dialogues for the Neo-Platonists, moving from the particular good to the universal good. The Timaeus and Parmenides stand out as a synthesis of Plato's natural philosophy and religious philosophy respectively.
There is a purpose to this process though, reading a text as it is supposed to be read makes us one with the text. the Neo-Platonists did not fall into a post-modernism, were each person constructs meaning from the text. Because there is some objectivity to the relationship, we can get to the intended meaning of a text.
Next we moved to discussing the process of interpreting an actual text. There are six parts to it: matter (character, time, place), form (style), nature (either expository or investigative), soul (problems of the text), intellect (topic), and good (the transformation of myself and the text towards the One).
Next we talked about we talked the Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides. Just as in epics, the commentary begins with an invocation of the gods interprets the text allegorically. We ended by dividing the text into four conversations.

Thursday, April 7, 2011

Class Synopisis April 6th

We began talking about Plotinus' critique of discoursive reasoning. Discoursive reasoning poses a significant problem for talking about The One, because we always think in a subject-object distinction. Thinking isomorphically is impossible for us. Even when thinking ourselves, we always refer to ourselves as an object. Plotinus gives us the example of a sphere. We are asked to place ourselves in the sphere. Plotinus argues that we cannot imagine this without becoming the sphere (something that I find particularly hard to imagine). Now this is related to Plotinus' ethics: happiness is freedom from objects of thought.
With all this cynicism (modern use) towards objects of thought, there seems to be a danger of denying the goodness of matter. This sort of principle, as my Aquinas professor will contend, crops up every hundred to two hundred years. In Plotinus' time it was the Gnostics (in other times it is the Manicheans, the Albigensians , or some sects of the Reformation). Plotinus contends that creation is not entirely bad and the world is not providential. Furthermore, salvation is not something waited for, it is something in us.
We moved on to talking about the Intellect. The Intellect is out of time, and likewise experiences no change (for time is a measure of change). We are discrete particulars of this Intellect. A question naturally arises: How do I not have knowledge of discrete particulars? The answer would be that this sort of knowledge is not a virtue. But there is perhaps major critique of this: this is imperfect knowledge. Not knowing everything, discrete or not, is still not knowing everything.
Next we posed the problem: How do we get to the One? There is an overwhelming significance to ritual in this conception. There is also an acceptance of all religions, but puts their gods at the level of the Intellect. This is particularly troubling for the Jewish/Christian/Muslim tradition, which describes their God analogously to the One (although that may be because of their influence from Neo-Platonism, especially the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. Earlier though, we said that Plotinus denied providence, a particularly central concept to many religions.

How to talk about The One

At the end of class, we reached a problem: How do we talk about The One? If the truth is non-representational, then is nearly impossible to form propositions that adequately represent it. So how do we talk about about. By calling it "The One," we are affirming some things. It is a being at the very least, although turns out to be Being, is undivided (thus one), and Plotinus argues, the cause of all other things. Now calling something the cause of other things is different than saying it is good. Calling something good supposes that it is composed of different parts, good being one (color might be another, body and soul would seem to also naturally be on this list. Denying something about it is also different. I deny that The One is composed, so is one. Yet Plotinus talks about The One, and says more than what has just been outlined. But how?
This question, I think can be answered by the Neo-Platonist Pseudo-Dionysius. Although Dionysius was a Christian, he was familiar with both Plotinus and Proclus. He came up with a theory to talk about God by using super immanent predication. First we affirm something of God like wise (or The One). Next we deny that of God (because He is not wise like us). Next we affirm that God is super-wise. Now I know that last one sounds silly, but the point is clear: if we talk about The One, it cannot be in the same way we talk about ourselves, we must talk by analogy. Clearly we must be able to talk about The One if we are to teach to others or even think about it, and the 2nd proposition of Dionysius theory gets around the critique of discoursive reasoning, because we do deny that The One is composed, but we also affirm something about it.

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Skeptics and Mythbusters

The show Mythbusters seems to be in the skeptical spirit: it looks at everyday beliefs that some have and try to uncover the reality of the situation. Now, there are major derivations. The Mythbusters do claim to "bust" myths, something a skeptic might be uncomfortable with, but there is something essentially in the spirit of skepticism. In the numerous myths they have tackled, they recognized that they is not enough evidence in favor of any side, and will suspend any final judgment on it.

Friday, March 18, 2011

The Illusion of Control

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x_6g4s9DkGc&feature=related
I talked about this part of the movie in class. Essentially the Turtle tells the mouse that he has to let go of the illusion of control. The two debate whether or not we have control over things, and to what extent we have control. the whole conversation had clear Stoic undertones (possibly Buddhist, but I am not trained to claim that).

I found this entire conversation enlightening for several reasons. Essentially, the turtle is saying that we have little control over what happens in the world, but we do have the ability to choice whether or not to follow it. The turtle is simply expounding Stoic metaphysics. At the end of the clip, he even returns to nature. He gets carried of into the sky by a gust of wind and flower petals. That scene to me seemed to be overtly Stoic: he returns to nature upon his death becomes one with it.

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Stoicism at War

In high school Latin class, we learned about Stoicism and Epicureanism as an aid to understand the texts we would translate. Our high school Latin teacher had an immense respect for the Stoics and for Cicero, and that has passed on to nearly all of his students. Although society tends to push a sort of Neo-Stoicism on men as the way to live life, it is genuinely hard to find a good example of Stoicism in the world today. As I was surfing the internet, trying to see if there was an actual renaissance of Stoic thought, I found this retired officer Vice Admiral James Stockdale. Stockdale, it turned out, never studied Epictetus in the classroom, but a former professor gave Stockdale a copy of the Enchiridion when he graduated. As a POW, Stockdale found immense comfort in the teachings of Epictetus, which I find a spectacular testament to the ability of Stoicism to grant someone peace while still participating in society. Epicurus and Diogenes are certainly profound thinkers, but there is a certain amount of uneasiness to most of us at the thought of secluding ourselves from society, no matter the degree. Stoicism remains a profound influence on the way I live my life, but I am by no means a model Stoic. What Stoicism preached over two millennia ago still has value for us today.

Friday, February 18, 2011

The Riddle of Epicurus

It is hard to imagine that Epicurus had any substantial influence on Western society, since he was essentially forgotten about prior to the Reformation. The early Church fathers demonized his philosophy for its materialism, which is about the only thing they could have done, since St. Paul seems to have copied their way of promoting Epicureanism and way of living (i.e. not getting married). However, there is one remnant that after coming across I was surprised to hear:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.

Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.

Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?

Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?

This small except has a powerful influence for the rest of metaphysical thought. The Riddle of Epicurus is the beginnings of the problem of evil. I bring this up because it remains a problem today, although has taken a various sort of form. Whereas Epicurus might be amenable to evil being a privation of the good, it seems to have become a hallmark of analytic philosophy to argue against this sort of thinking: if we refer to something, then it seems it must have some sort of reality. Of course this is patently untrue, and you find analogous concepts elsewhere. Blindness is a good example, as it represents a privation of sight. Epicurus, outside of his modern counterparts, asks a substantial question, "Why is there a privation of good?" While there may be varied responses to this, I am not attempting to solve it, only to point out a substantial mistake of contemporary philosophy. It has all the vocabulary of pre-modern philosophy, without the understanding of what the words mean.

Thursday, February 10, 2011

Cynicism and Christianity

Before I go to work on Thursday nights, I usually grab the Maroon to read at the desk when its not busy. Now I opened it up to find someone quote the Bible, and then proceeded to emphasize realized eschatology. My purpose of this is not intentional to tackle the issue of how to interpret the Bible, but I find it does an incredible disservice to the Christian community to interpret the Bible incorrectly.
I know that comparing Jesus to Cynicism is nothing new, but this past week learning Cynicism has allowed me to make many connections myself. And its not like the theologians/historians are blowing smoke. Jesus' lifestyle, as described in any account we have of Him, is remarkably similar to a Cynic's lifestyle: he wandered around surviving on the bare minimum, he overturned tables in the Temple where people were selling goods (something I can imagine Diogenes doing if he subscribed to a mainstream religion), and he preached a very simple lifestyle. His way of life, out of all the Hellenistic philosophies, most closely resembles Cynicism.
Back to the realized eschatology portion. From the parallels I have drawn, I do not think Jesus' message can be interpreted as Him wanting to to have an abundant life now without looking at the text upside-down. I think these parallels can give us a deeper understanding of Jesus' teachings, and help understand the true nature of Christianity.

Friday, February 4, 2011

Cobert's Alpha Dog on Habits

One of my favorite shows is the Colbert Report on Comedy Central, and I was watching old Alpha Dog of the Week clips when I came upon this. Colbert talked about Domino's being the Alpha Dog of the Week because Domino's decided to change change up their recipe and not apologize for their terrible product. While Colbert focused on the fact that Domino's did not apologize, I would instead like to focus on Domino's change in recipe and how it relates to habit.
What Domino's did requires an enormous amount of self-awareness. To make that change could not have been a purely internal thing. The pizza chain would have needed to see the reaction of the customers before it could have changed. In the same way, we must first recognize that our actions are wrong, according to Aristotle, before we can change. Having that self-awareness is much harder for us than it is for a corporation. Whereas the corporation can simply take a poll on customer satisfaction, people do not have that luxury. In the first place, the virtuous are in the minority. Finding a person who can help you work towards virtue is indeed rare, much rarer than finding a customer that has a relatively normal sense of taste. But on top of that, it is much easier to change for Domino's than it is for any of us.
This is not to discourage any of us that we may very well need change, but more of an analogy to how we may do it. We first need to find the virtuous person who can point us towards the virtuous life who can encourage change within us. Change may not be as easy for us as it was for Domino's, but we can still change for the better.

Sunday, January 30, 2011

The Unmoved Mover

One of my favorite Jesuits, James Martin, wrote in one his books (I think it was his autobiography) about his undergraduate experience learning Arisotle's Metaphysics. Sister Louise French taught the class at Loyola Chicago for all the novices, and he recounted the story of how he learned about the unmoved mover.
He told of how, one day in class, they were all told to make a circle. They subsequently were told to extend their arms out to each of their neighbors. Sister French then dictated this one rule: if you are tapped, then you must tap the next person. So if someone were to tap my right hand, I would have to tap the next person with my left. It is no surprise that with this one rule, nothing happened. This is how she explained Aristotle's unmoved mover. This mover is necessarily outside of the constraints of other objects in the world. So for this experiment of Sister French to work, there would necessarily need to be something outside of the circle to begin the causal chain.
When it came time to have his cumulative exam, not just of the course but of his entire undergraduate education in philosophy and theology, one his questions asked to explain Aristotle's doctrine of the unmoved mover. He blurted out, "The untapped tapper!" All of his examiners looked puzzled, except for Sister French who replied, "Good," and promptly proceeded to the next question.
Sister French has since passed on, and James Martin was so gracious to her that her wrote in memory of her for America Magazine. But this scene is forever embedded in my mind, both for its relevance to philosophy and relevance to my desire at the time to soak up anything he wrote.

Friday, January 21, 2011

Virtue and the Flourishing Life

Contemplating Plato’s account of virtue, I wondered whether it would be more virtuous to overcome desire, or to simply not have the desire at all. We all consider the man who has overcome desire more admirable than the man without desire. In fact, most would even find the man without desire blander than the other. Is this the way it should be though? If the latter person is indeed more virtuous, is he not more laudable?

This all builds up to my biweekly meeting with my spiritual director: he is what I consider to be one of the wisest people on Loyola’s campus, and a man of exceedingly great virtue, not just in my opinion, but from anyone who I have met that knows him well. He is a man of little desire. There is no desire to overcome. I, on the other hand, come in to him and talk about how hard it can sometimes be making the best decision. Who is more laudable? It is my opinion that He is, but what I find is that he is content with or without the praise.

Perhaps we praise those who actually deliberate because they are the ones that need the praise. An already virtuous person does not need to be reminded that the decisions made are virtuous. On the other hand, the person striving towards virtue does need to be reminded that the virtuous decision is good, because the goods from that decision are not immediately recognized. A happy life, not in the modern sense, but in the sense that it a flourishing lifestyle, does not arise immediately from our decision. It arises from the continual striving for the flourishing life.

Friday, January 14, 2011

Practicality in Hellenism

Something that strikes me as odd is the amount of practicality that Hellenistic philosophy. Most of the philosophical thinking started on the practical side of philosophy. The search for the good life is the primary concern on their metaphysics.
But that kind of thinking today does not go on today. Today, science takes precedence over philosophy, and the search for the good life is largely replaced by scientism. With the pragmatism brought on by Quine after "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," its curious that no single school of thought has developed similar to this Hellenistic model.
I think its speaks a lot about modern culture that only science is regarded as containing useful knowledge, and something like insights into what makes a person's life go best are largely ignored due to lack of respect towards ethics brought on by early analytic philosophy.
Another curious aspect of Hellenistic philosophy is the completely different mode of discourse for talking about ethics, and I noticed this in Aristotle and Plato also. For them, what is right and wrong are secondary questions, if the question arises at all. Contrast that with modern ethics, which only answers what is right and wrong. It is no accident, then, the modern ethics failed when scrutinized by Logical Positivism. Logical Positivism can analyze statements that try to claim rightness and wrongness, but when discussing what makes a person life best, or what is the highest form of happiness, Logical Positivism cannot intervene.
I think, based on my initial reactions to Hellenism, I can say that modern ethics would be much better off discussing ethics this way. Utility and duty could still have a place, but a more important question would be asked in ethics.