Friday, February 18, 2011

The Riddle of Epicurus

It is hard to imagine that Epicurus had any substantial influence on Western society, since he was essentially forgotten about prior to the Reformation. The early Church fathers demonized his philosophy for its materialism, which is about the only thing they could have done, since St. Paul seems to have copied their way of promoting Epicureanism and way of living (i.e. not getting married). However, there is one remnant that after coming across I was surprised to hear:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.

Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.

Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?

Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?

This small except has a powerful influence for the rest of metaphysical thought. The Riddle of Epicurus is the beginnings of the problem of evil. I bring this up because it remains a problem today, although has taken a various sort of form. Whereas Epicurus might be amenable to evil being a privation of the good, it seems to have become a hallmark of analytic philosophy to argue against this sort of thinking: if we refer to something, then it seems it must have some sort of reality. Of course this is patently untrue, and you find analogous concepts elsewhere. Blindness is a good example, as it represents a privation of sight. Epicurus, outside of his modern counterparts, asks a substantial question, "Why is there a privation of good?" While there may be varied responses to this, I am not attempting to solve it, only to point out a substantial mistake of contemporary philosophy. It has all the vocabulary of pre-modern philosophy, without the understanding of what the words mean.

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