Thoughts on Skepticism

It seems that all evidence we glean concerning the world is mediated through our senses. What else do we have but our senses? I really enjoy the phenomenological task of returning to "the lived world." The use of the lived world as the spring from which all truth is engendered is an idea that I think can be related to Skepticism. To be a little dogmatic about the whole issue, which skepticism might possibly be at its core, I think it makes sense to say that at each moment our ideas express not only the truth but also our capacity to attain it. This understanding of truth may be the one way to maintain a practical approach to skepticism without delving into the hardcore skeptical debates inherent to discussions of other minds, the external world, and theoretical entities. If ideas express the truth and our capacity to attain it, maybe there is something truly wise in applying skepticism to all philosophies, and also something that is essentially dependent on foundations.

Some thoughts on "hardcore" skepticism, which should probably be called radical skepticism, and how it differs from non-radical skepticism.

Skepticism of the external world, I think , has evolved into two distinct yet similar philosophical understandings. There is the Skepticism of the hellenistic period and one that took rise with Descartes in the modern tradition. Skepticism of the external world is only one type in a much broader philosophical concept with many pros and cons in its actualization. The way hellenistic skepticism is similar to that of the modern is in the way that both are founded on the argumentation of refuting given foundations. It seems that many people would argue, maybe even people in this class, that skeptical arguments rely on the idea they are attacking. Skeptics rely on the conviction that our beliefs concerning the world are "underdetermined" by evidence on which truth is based. This is the portrait of skepticism that I would like to distinguish. This skepticism relates to the foundationalist assumption (Wikipedia, YEAH!) and in this relationship the foundationalism essentially gives rise to skeptical argument.

Each moment our ideas express not only the truth but also our capacity to obtain the truth at a given time. Skepticism begins once we conclude that our ideas/beliefs are always unjustified or unreasonable--but this relies on some sort of absolute knowledge to base your false ideas upon. If we consider our ideas as something wrapped up in our contact with being and culture, although limited by the given moment, they are able to express the truth provided we keep and recognize this dialogue between the moment, ideas expressed, being, and culture. They all mediate truth in an almost inexpressible way. The we all conceptualize the cogito may be this expression of the inexpressible. Grasping myself requires a limiting to an "I think", but the way we know we think could be interpreted as the cogito acting as doubt. In this doubting I question all objects of experience--my phenomenal experience. Doubting becomes a self grasping act because in doubt the very fact of doubt obstructs doubt. It seems like this relationship between the fact of doubt and the doubting act are somewhat contingent. The doubting act is essentially dependent on the reality of doubt, which is in an gross generalization, the way skepticism is essentially dependent on epistemological foundations.

I grasp myself, not as transparent, but as a particular thought engaged with objects. I am a thought which grasps itself as possessing an ideal of truth. Thought is given to itself, we find ourselves thinking and become aware of this thinking some way, the way I am assuming is through doubt.

I have been reading The Primacy of Perception, so that is a major influence on this blog post.

Doubt

I am going to continue formulating this later, maybe use it as the beginning to my paper?